|
|||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||
Two years ago, in aftermath of war, almost nothing in Kosovo worked. Today, after, by any standard, a remarkably short time, many of the foundations of a modern, European-based civil society are in place. Public services are up and running, municipal Assemblies are functioning,
administrative departments implement policies for the long-term good of
the people of Kosovo. A growing Kosovar civil service takes increasing
responsibility. The emergency relief and stabilization work now completed, two major
challenges remain for an increasingly self-governed Kosovo: to demonstrate
democracy within the substantial autonomy foreseen under Security Council
Resolution 1244; and to succeed with economic development. Neither will
be possible without broadly supported law and order. In the beginning Each "pillar" (as they were subsequently known) of the interim administration was headed by a Deputy SRSG. Together with a Principal Deputy SRSG, they would constitute an Executive Committee, assisting the SRSG from the perspective of priorities under their responsibility. UNMIK's operational priorities also included close coordination with the international security presence (KFOR), establishing functional relationships with representatives of the people of Kosovo at central and local levels, and coping with the unexpectedly rapid return of Kosovo's refugees from surrounding countries. The appointment of 5 UNMIK regional and 30 municipal administrators facilitated both the relationships with political and civil society representatives and the practical requirements of reconstituting a basic administrative system. The civil administration structure also enabled contact (along with KFOR representatives) with the still militarized and active Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). As a result, the two main Kosovo-Albanian political parties and the KLA endorsed the UN Mission in Kosovo in the first week. All three committed their support for a multi-party democracy and, within days, the KLA signed an agreement to demobilize. As the number of returning refugees grew exponentially, the Pillar for Humanitarian Support (UNHCR) delivered increasing amounts of emergency rations and building materials to families who arrived to find their homes destroyed and their livelihood in tatters. Donors responded generously to UNMIK appeals for contributions to a trust fund for emergency projects. The other key challenge facing the initial administration was to secure the environment. The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) took on the task of clearing houses and the surrounding land of booby traps, mines and unexploded ordnance. An embryo UN civilian police force was slowly assembled as the first law enforcement mission for the UN police anywhere. Both featured close coordination with KFOR and aimed to take over full responsibility later. In retrospect
Administratively, one of the first priorities was coping with a massively- displaced population and the influx of returning refugees.As the UNMIK's humanitarian pillar (UNHCR) brought the emergency situation under control, the civilian administration pillar (the UN itself) focused on administrative stabilization. UNHCR, together with the institution-building pillar (OSCE), documented human rights violations, both those preceding and following the arrival of UNMIK and KFOR. Together with the World Bank, the reconstruction and economic development pillar (led by the European Union) meanwhile quantified the damage to Kosovo's housing, public infrastructure and economy-and the ways international effort could rebuild them as soon as possible. Substantively, already by the end of UNMIK's first twelve months, the Mission could look back on significant achievements-filling basic needs, restoring public services, clearing land mines and other unexploded war materials, involving local representatives, initiating a joint administration, creating nascent institutions essential for a functioning democracy, rebuilding homes and public infrastructure and reviving agriculture. Progress, albeit with acknowledged gaps, was also made in ensuring respect for human rights and law and order, in involving the Kosovo Serb communities in the administration, and in a more general economic recovery. The agreement with the KLA to demobilize in line with SCR 1244 foresaw recruitment of 5,000 (3,000 active, 2,000 in reserve) into a civil emergency and protection force, the Kosovo Protection Corps. As public services were restored, basic needs were also being catered for more generally. The Economic Reconstruction Pillar (EU) took over responsibility for electricity production, beginning the long task of making good the consequences of previous public utilities mismanagement. The Civil Administration Pillar established departments for most other public services-justice, education, health, local administration, labour relations, emergency services (fire and rescue, civil protection), roads and transportation, post and telecommunications, agriculture and forestry, environmental protection, and the issuance of public documents (birth- marriage-, death and vehicle registration certificates). Also by the end of the first two year, the Institution-Building Pillar (OSCE) had established other institutions required to underpin democratic systems of government, including those for running elections. The Central Elections Commission and its sub-commissions, together with voter registration entities in the civil administration, subsequently managed successful elections for local government in October 2000, thereby initiating the first step towards self-government (see p.17). From Kosovar participation to "Kosovarization"
Agreement by Kosovo Albanian political leaders to share provisional management of Kosovo until future elections was a Mission landmark. Signed in December 1999, this created the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) and expanded the KTC to 36 members thus forming an embryo parliament. Kosovo representatives joined UNMIK's pillar heads in a new Interim Administrative Council (IAC), which took on the role of a cabinet. At civil service level, some 20 administrative departments each had a Kosovar as well an international Co-Head, and although still largely UNMIK-controlled, took over nearly all the territory's civil service functions, with the exception of policing. Strong, independent local government (see p.15) had meanwhile been established as a core principle, intended not only to survive but to become part of self-government. Reflecting "subsidiarity" concepts and benefiting from European best-practice in the field of municipal governance, municipal structures exercise distinct power and responsibilities vis-a-vis the central departments. Problematic throughout, however, had been the participation of Kosovo Serbs, and to some extent other minority groups also. The Kosovo Serb delegation left the KTC in September 1999 protesting the creation of the KPC as an organization for demobilized KLA members. Until it joined the reconstituted KTC and the IAC in April 2000, this left the fledgling Kosovo Police Service as the only interim institution still with Serb participation. Also because of pressure from Belgrade, Kosovo Serbs did not meaningfully participate in civil registration in mid-2000. They were thus ineligible to vote in the October municipal election. A year later, in contrast, with new governments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbia, Kosovo Serbs are being actively encouraged at least to join the civil register -the essential precursor for voting in future elections.The Turkish community, which had partially boycotted the summer 2000 registration exercise over language issues, also began to register. At local government level, gaps left by Kosovo Serb and Turkish non-participation in the October 2000 election were filled when their representatives accepted UNMIK's invitations to serve on the municipal assemblies in municipalities where they were either a majority or a substantial minority. From fears to rights
Establishing and protecting human rights were a Mission driving force from day one, to some extent its raison d'être. For Kosovo under future self-government, such rights have meanwhile been enshrined in two chapters of the Constitutional Framework promulgated in May 2001 (see p.17). An Ombudsperson's Office, set up as an independent body in November 2000, helps safeguard human rights vis-a-vis the administration. But despite such administrative attention, human rights and their infringement through violence and intimidation remain a major Mission concern (see p.7). Successive joint reviews of the situation of ethnic minorities by UNHCR and OSCE acknowledged an ongoing climate of violence and impunity, as well as widespread discrimination, harassment and intimidation against Kosovo non-Albanians. Reflecting this, UNMIK assigns the highest priority to bringing about inter-ethnic cooperation and to preventing its opposite. Corresponding responsibility has thus been retained throughout in the Office of Human Rights and Community Affairs (OHRCA), part of the SRSG's own office. OHRCA initiatives, in cooperation with UNHCR and OSCE, led ultimately to an agreed Agenda for Co-existence and participation of Kosovo Serbs and other minority groups in the joint administration.
Another human rights priority was for families to learn the fate of thousands of missing persons, and to obtain the release of those known to be detained in Serbian prisons. Thanks to efforts of the OHRCA, the Centre on Detainees and the personal intervention of two successive SRSGs, all political prisoners, including the Gjakova group, held for alleged terrorism are now free. With most other missing persons (estimated at upwards of 3,900-some 2,700
Kosovo Albanians and more than 1,200 Kosovo Serbs and other communities)
feared dead, the UNMIK's Victims Recovery and Identification Commission
(VRIC) works with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
to help the families involved. Plans are for families to be offered DNA
testing to help determine if their missing members are among the 1,250
remains still unidentified in UNMIK's hands. Nascent institutions Equally important for building a democratic society are the non-governmental institutions created by UNMIK's institution-building pillar (OSCE). These in turn support the electoral process, political party development, strengthen civil society organizations, promote the rule of law, develop the media, and train public servants. OSCE's Political Party Development programmes foster Kosovo's political culture. Its media development initiatives encourage a balanced and diverse media. Its Institute of Civil Administration promotes transparency and public accountability in administration. The Kosovo Judicial Institute trains judges and prosecutors, the Kosovo Law Centre works as a legal think tank. By mid-2001 OSCE-run Kosovo Police Service School had trained some 4,000 cadets. Reconstruction and economic development
Priorities established by the Pillar for Reconstruction and Economic Development include setting up sustainable institutions for a viable, market-based economy and development of the private sector as the main employer. Prerequisites are a strong, stable, economic, fiscal and regulatory environment, with a stable currency (currently the Deutsche Mark, next year the euro) and a functioning banking system subject to high standards of regulation and supervision. Today, Kosovo enjoys the services of four commercial banks, all under the supervision of the BPK. It has a stable, sustainable budget that is increasingly financed through domestic revenues. Control mechanisms in the CFA ensure efficiency and probity in public spending. A liberal trade and customs regime is designed to permit both economic growth and exports within the Balkan region. A nearly completed regulatory framework comprises business registration, enterprise and contract laws, competition and foreign investment laws and mechanisms for resolving disputes-all essential for attracting domestic and foreign investment while providing increasing disincentives for business to operate illegally. In line with the Mission priority of reviving industry as a major employer, a two-pronged strategy aims to attract investment for Kosovo's socially-owned enterprises. Under commercialization arrangements, investors lease the assets and employ the labour force under agreed terms for an agreed period such as ten years. The possibility of privatization remains, however, subject to international agreement on wider issues of commercial property ownership. Outlook The Constitutional Framework paves the way for Kosovo-wide elections on 17 November 2001 by determining the size, shape, powers and responsibilities of Kosovo's institutions for self-government that will follow. It prescribes a government with a Prime Minister and Ministers and lays the groundwork for how provisional self-government will operate-with an elected Assembly, a President of Kosovo, an Assembly Presidency, Assembly Committees, an independent judiciary and independent offices.
Gaining broad-based support for the Framework, showed that, even with a subject that is complex and crucial for the future of all Kosovo's national communities, a very large measure of agreement could be reached outside the recognized areas of political conflict. But it also showed how difficult it can be, when political representatives lack the courage and the maturity to compromise, to go the final stretch with any issue. The creation of Pillar I (Police and Justice) is UNMIK's structural response not only to counter organized crime and terrorism but also to the crucial need to contain inter-ethnic violence. For the international community, donors especially, cessation of violence and its replacement with co-existence between Kosovo's communities are hallmarks of Kosovo's progress towards democracy. It also reflects the determination of the present Head of UNMIK to strengthen the rule of law and bring violent crime under control. Although crime levels stabilized during the year 2000, the level of violent crimes remains unacceptably high. The aim is to bring them down so that the people of Kosovo have a safe and secure environment and a reliable justice system which reflects the rule of law. Without it, any other progress towards peace and well-being Kosovo is likely to be in vain. Another hallmark of success will be the return of displaced people to their homes. This includes Kosovo Serbs from outside Kosovo, and from their temporary homes within Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians from abroad and the remaining Kosovo Albanian detainees from Serbian prisons. Progress in all these areas will be pivotal for relations between the administrations in Pristina (UNMIK today, the institutions of self-government next year) and Belgrade. UNMIK laid part of the groundwork when the Joint Committee for Serb Returns endorsed the Framework for Return of Kosovo Serbs in January 2001. A further encouraging step was the IAC's acceptance of that framework as a set of principles. UNMIK's recent opening of an office in Belgrade and the steady improvements in relations with FRY and other neighbouring states will also play a key role. |