25 November 2002, Monday Edition

CONTENTS

Dangerous passivity of the Kosovar government (Zëri)

Zëri carries an article by the 'Zëri team' suggesting that Albanians should very quickly reach a balance of political will, well known aims and their actions. They should also very quickly get ready in all possible aspects for the complicated process of the final status. If not, then Kosovo's final status will not be matched to their political will.

This is the message that Zëri has received from one senior western official, who is known to be in favor of the Kosovo issue.

According to him and other trustworthy western sources, UNMIK chief Michael Steiner has in the last months succeeded in linking up the fulfillment of certain standards with the initiation of the political status, acceptable policy for the west. Brussels, New York and Washington, impacted by the fact that the S and M Union is for three years, are already convinced that perhaps the first preparatory steps should start. Thus, we have to add here that, except for EU diplomacy chief Javier Solana, it is difficult to find anyone in the West who would believe in the possibility of its functioning as a unified state.

Nonetheless, creation of an international mechanism that would make possible the favorable end of the Kosovo issue has still not been clarified. It is not known who could be a mediator: the EU alone, the US with the EU, the Contact group. The US' almost hundred percent preoccupation with the war against terrorism and the disarmament of Iraq has impacted as an additional complication in this respect. But only a few believe that there can be a fruitful solution for Kosovo without the US.

Then, it is not known whether this should be a gradual process of negotiation or if it should all be the result of an international conference. Finally, it is not known what the role of the West would be. More precisely, would it be a clear moderator, or moderator and arbitration, as during the Rambouillet conference.

The only thing known for now is that, in the end, the UN SC will determine Kosovo's future with a new resolution.

UNMIK chief Michael Steiner, in addition to clarifying the standards that have to be fulfilled by Kosovars in order to build a democratic society, has also stressed his position where final status options are concerned. In fact, Steiner made the 'negative definition' of Kosovo's final status. Thus, according to him, Kosovo cannot return on the position that it had before 1999, but territorial division of Kosovo is also not an option. If we leave aside these two options, it remains for Kosovo to become an independent state or to be part of some complicated Serbia and Montenegro union. Bearing in mind that the time of such unions has expired in the Balkans, and that even Serbia and Montenegro cannot live together any more, then it is clear that this solution is impossible.

It seems that this conclusion, which rules in the West, makes the idea of the territorial division of Kosovo, against which Steiner is evidently aligned, reanimated. Famous western diplomats told Zëri that Steiner has started being criticized in some western centers for opposing the idea of division, by using among the other things UN SC Resolution 1244, which leaves the issue of Kosovo's final status completely open. At his public appearances, Steiner has excluded some of the options, including here Kosovo's division. We learned that Steiner has received criticism from UN Administration for this and other issues, because, according to them, Steiner has a dynamic that is faster than it should.

Be that as it may, if Steiner successfully completes the plan for unification of Mitrovica, and the establishment of UNMIK administration in northern Kosovo, the idea for division of Kosovo will be almost undone.

Western circles consulted by Zëri, affirm that despite the well known fact that the final status will be the result of an international decision, many things will depend on the actions of Kosovars, who should be the main factor in this process. In this context, Albanian political leaders, according to western sources, should clarify the connection between their will and their actions, which would make this will come true.

More precisely: If Albanian politicians want Kosovo's independence within its known borders, then it has to be demonstrated in all possible aspects that the Serb minority would be treated properly in a Kosovo's state. Thus we could all widely elaborate on all the achievements of the past two years, which brought better security for Serbs and a more favourable legal/political position in the Kosovo government, and this fact stands. But a certain incident, no matter what it is, calls into question these achievements and brings up suggestions that extremist forces continue to exist in Kosovo.

Then from the western point of view, we should move forward and prepare a special package of Serb and other minority treatment in a Kosovo state. We certainly have to add here that the Kosovo government should, starting now, offer clear guarantees to its neighboring countries (Macedonia and Serbia) that there would be no territorial pretences and that they would support the ideas for very good cooperation in the institutionalizing of this cooperation within the process of integration of the region into the EU.

All these things, based on western sources, require the Kosovar government to start acting in this direction, where public appearances could be combined with the preparing of confidential materials, which would serve as justification of Kosovo's independence.

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Kosovo and Metohija: Far Away From A Promised Land (VREME)

by Dr. Slobodan Samardzic (Advisor to the Yugoslav President, CCK VP, and director of Political Studies at The Centre for Liberal-Democratic Studies in Belgrade)

After the municipal elections, Kosovo and Metohija remained what it was - a very sick organism, which, as such, became resistant to medication from the outside, i.e., activities of the international administration. With Michael Steiner, it has finally become part of this difficult problem.

The international administration has existed in Kosovo and Metohija for three years now, but its basic goal, creating a peaceful coexistence for ethnic communities, as defined by the UNSCR 1244, is far from being achieved. If we want to get a bit closer to the truth, we can say that, in this respect, the situation has remained the same as it was in June 1999, when the international community directly took over administration of the province. Since that moment, only the relation between the majority and the minority has changed, by detaching Kosovo and Metohija from the state-legal competencies of the FRY and Serbia, the Albanians in Kosovo became the majority and Serbs (and other minorities) in a bigger numeric scale than before March 1999. About two-thirds of the Serbian population (220-230,000) fled to central Serbia, Vojvodina and Montenegro and have not returned yet. If the international administration enabled a large number of Albanian refugees (around 800,000) to return to their homes after the war and three months of refuge, then it is hard to justify the fact that the return of a three times smaller number of Serb IDPs, who have been living in their refuges for more than three years, is not enabled.

The Situation After Three and a Half Years
During this period, the stage of a multiethnic Kosovo was related to the ethno-democratic status quo in the province. For Albanians, this is a fait accompli, a permanent political situation, which, from their perspective, could only get better by the continued process of Serbs leaving the province until their desired goal is reached and only couple of million Serbs remain, just enough to justify an
idyllic international picture of a multiethnic Kosovo. For the international community, this is a verbally unacceptable situation, because UNSCR 1244 binds them to ensure return for all IDPs, meaning Serbs, as well. Being incapable, even unwilling to do this, the international community, embodied in its highest officials, has been producing for more than two years now a simulacrum of a multiethnic Kosovo. In their programs of institutionalization, decentralization and returns, representatives of numerous UNMIK departments are doing everything possible to portray the situation as relatively normal and to project peaceful and gradual changes from this temporary position. One could get a picture from their reports that Kosovo and Metohija is an area of relatively peaceful transition, where the conflict of two ethnic communities is transferred to political institutions and being resolved there in a more or less successful manner. These reports create an impression that extremists are only dwelling in northern Mitrovica, not letting the influences of a beneficial multiethnicity get to this Serb enclave, as well.

In spite of this picture that has been continuously sent to the world public, the reality in Kosovo is absolutely different. As a comparable unit, it is advisable to take the situation during Milosevic's regime. It was characterized by a large and massive violation of human rights, of the Kosovo Albanians in particular, punished by NATO with a three-month bombing of the entire country, and immediately after this by the establishing of the UN military and civil administration in the province. During the repressive regime, in the twelve-year period, Albanians at least had freedom of movement, but also sufficient political space to organize an almost complete parallel life, taking into account here the elections for their parallel political institutions. Today, Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija do not have elementary physical security or freedom of movement, except in a clearly defined space where they live compactly, so their movement is limited, depending on the space of their homogeneity - from four municipalities where they are a majority, through villages and parts of settlements, to houses and surrounding buildings (and two skyscrapers in Pristina). Their position is comparable only with the position of Albanians during the bombing when a large number of Albanians were forced to leave the province. But since the arrival of the international forces, at work are field politics of a permanent Albanian comeback, this time in the presence of international administration representatives. Faced with such behavior of the majority population but unable to confront it, top representatives of this administration commenced propaganda on the gradual but sure success, instead of a difficult and risky job, of defending the elementary human rights of the Serb population.

We will show how such UNMIK conduct practically looks like with a very characteristic and convincing example. At issue is its return policy. This is the most important test of international presence in Kosovo, not only because of the strict decree in UNSCR 1244, but for far deeper moral and humanitarian reasons.

Until this day, on the basis of strong evidence, 126 IDPs have returned to Kosovo and Metohija (Osojane). Although, lately, UNMIK head and his people have been talking about some 2,000 returnees, but their names and the places to which they returned are hidden. The explanation is interesting: conspiracy is necessary so the alleged fact would not provoke Albanians. Otherwise, this UNMIK smart tactic is directly opposed to one of his principles of the return - that people should return to regions, houses and apartments from which they had been expelled. Idealistically viewed, it would be best for all Serbs to return to the once ethnically mixed settlements (teleology of a multi-ethnic Kosovo), but without Albanians noticing this. Since even UNMIK's people know this is impossible, they stated two more principles in their plan: return is individual (!) and local Albanians, former and future neighbors and co-citizens of returnees, must have their say in this.

The reason for Steiner's enormous interest in Serbs turning out for the local elections, called for and held on October 26th, hides in these three principles (return to the former place of residence, on individual basis, with the consent of the local Albanians). The problem of the returns, originally purely humanitarian, became the object of multiple punctual policies of the local communities in the virtually multiethnic Kosovo. In place of the outmoded counter-collective approach, we have, as the UNMIK Chief likes to say, a moderate individual-liberal approach, which takes into account the preferences of individuals instead of abstract collectivities.

UNMIK needed three full years to arrive at these saving liberal principles. The plan is not only liberal but also optimal. Returnees (and they are Serbs by some historical case) should individually register; autochthons (and they are Albanians by the same case) should individually accept them, while it is up to UNMIK to offer logistics. These are the principles. But what does the concrete plan look like?

It hasn't existed until a month ago. It has been created only after people from the CCK insisted that UNMIK make a stand on the plan made by the Center almost a year ago. Upon the plan from the CCK, Serbs should return to 24 groups of settlements, essentially in the areas of their former existence, but also in new settlements concentrated on areas today homogeneously inhabited by Serbs. The reason is simple - security and freedom of movement, which UNMIK has not been able to guarantee for years now. This plan, initially silenced, than avoided, ended up being presented as originating from UNMIK and should represent the first operative phase of these famous principles.

In short, the plan looks like this for the first predictable phase: Serbs should return by themselves to two locations (Novaka and Zupa), together with Albanians to one (Podgorica), together with Albanians and Bosniaks to one (Gornje Selo) and together with Albanians and Romany to one location (Orahovac). Albanians are returning by themselves to two locations (Donja Vitina and Leposavic), together with Gorans and Ashkalia in another two locations (Dragas and Mala Dobraja) and together with Roma in one (Gnjilane). Bosniaks return by themselves to three locations in the Pec municipality. Roma are returning with Egyptians to one location, also in the Pec municipality.

For now, there is no quantity return plan, and how could it exist when, in the liberal sense, a man is one quality and never a quantity, a number, or a part of a collective entity. From Steiner's individualistic point of view, at issue are 220-230 thousand individual Serbs, and not merely Serbs who should decide as individuals and concretely opt for return. Since priority is given to quality and not quantity, the multiethnic quality of return is important. The concrete plan encompasses members of all national communities, regardless of the fact that Serbs, by percentage and by absolute numbers, are definitely the most present among the forced IDPs. If we are to project UNMIK's return plan by duration and starting from the number of potential returnees, exposing to Steiner's remark on the non-liberal view of the problem, all Albanians would return to their homes within several months, all other non-Albanians within several years, and all Serbs within several decades.

Of course, nobody here is crazy, least of all the makers of this plan. Serbs from Kosovo are already calling it "the plan of non-return," which reflects well UNMIK's intention: to work but not to get it done. Some serious approach to this issue would confront them with Albanian politicians and the Albanian population, and this is what they fear the most. Behind the seemingly clear title "UN mission in Kosovo and Metohija" stand numerous individual mandates and personal plans - from the most ordinary soldier and policeman, through numerous administrative clerks, to international community officials. For each of them, the mandate is time-limited and, along with this, according to the rank, well-paid, and nobody wishes, without some serious need (therefore, when he or she is personally threatened), to expose him-herself to death by tackling with numerous members of a militarized, archaic and criminalized society as is the Albanian one in Kosovo. Among UNMIK and KFOR personnel the following rule has long been valid - do you job with as little as mess as possible and run away.

Local elections between promises and blackmail
The last local elections occurred in the shadow of such realistic policy of the international administration in Kosovo and Metohija. Once again the Serbs became the subject of increased international attention because their acceptance has become the key moment of legitimacy for the international presence in the province. Such attention on the Serbs has been directed during the making of the Constitutional framework for provisional self-rule, whose adoption passed without the consent of Serb representatives. When the Constitutional framework should have passed its first test, elections for the Kosovo Assembly, Steiner's predecessor, Hans Haekkerup, was forced to accept one document, the Agreement on Implementing UNSCR 1244, which he signed together with the head of the CCK, carrying additional guarantees for Serbs. Steiner's entire policy towards Serbs was contained in ignoring this document and, thus, in the propaganda on the continuous progress in institutionalizing Kosovo's public life. All until the moment when he realized that Serbs, both those whose return to the province has become more uncertain than before and those who live an existentially uncertain daily life in Kosovo, were massively resolved to boycott the local elections. Since the success of the main Kosovo administrator is not, and for the third time in a row, measured upon the goals of UNSCR 1244, but upon the story (propaganda) on normalization, these elections were unusually important for Steiner only in the context of the rhetoric of normalization. Faced with the overwhelming stand of the Serb population, he presented his decentralization seven-point plan on the eve of the elections (1 October).

The topic of the decentralization of authority is objectively an important topic for Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. In a solid system of local self-rule and adequate regionalization, they could have a basis for their public engagement that would be in accordance with the idea of a multiethnic Kosovo. This is the only way for them to remain in this region and for two-thirds of their expelled fellow nationals to
return and start a somewhat normal life. Scattered in ghettos and small enclaves throughout Kosovo, where they have been exposed not only to majoritization of the Albanian majority, but also to terror on an almost daily basis, they can expect nothing but extremely inhumane living conditions and prepare to leave as soon as possible. Way back in June, the CCK offered its project of decentralization to UNMIK, but at that time this project raised no interest with international community representatives. The same way as he essentially refused the project for returns, Steiner suddenly recalled this before the municipal elections in order to motivate otherwise disinterested Serbs to go to the polls. But even at
this point, the virtuous international administrator was not thinking about Serbs, but about the international power centers. Before opening talks with Serb representatives and with representatives of the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities, he asked for and received the international factors' support for his seven-point plan. This, however, was no program, but only seven, almost simple, sentences, clearly saying that upon a significant Serb turnout at the elections, he would open talks on decentralization with representatives of Serbs, Albanians and others. At that point, this was quite insufficient for a serious bargain.

Days prior to the elections were marked by an utmost uncertainty regarding Serb participation. As a matter of fact, it was even more obvious that they would not respond in sufficient numbers, due to the conditions. It was no conditioning in any way, as the primary experience based on living in Kosovo and Metohija made impossible believing in even bigger and more solid promises than these offered by the administrator. His ugly maneuvers, such as falsifying the allegedly positive standpoint of the Serbian Patriarch regarding the elections and his seven-point plan, only intensified resistance of the Serb population and distrust of their political representatives. There was nothing left to him but to
place one last offer to them. In the form of an Announcement, which is by all means a public act, he created a possibility of constituting the "municipal units" for "larger non-majority communities", consisting of one or more villages, settlements or urban areas within the existing municipalities, as separate units of the local self-government. These units would have their own, elected bodies, authority and budget, and would autonomously decide on a set of issues important for the local population. However, this possibility was linked (in other words, conditioned) to "significant" participation in the elections by the local population (read: Serbs) in these areas. By doing so, their political representatives would put up their candidacies for political talks on working out the proposal, and upon its legalization in the form of law, they would create a possibility for realizing their rights to have separate municipal units within the existing municipalities or by submitting a petition.

This offer arrived too late (only five days before the elections) to attract precisely those who would benefit the most from its possible implementation. Those are the Serbs in the Albanian ethnically dominated municipalities. Being presented this late, it probably did not intend to reach these poor and desperate people. The fact of the matter was that the offer had been directed to the Kosovo Serb and the Belgrade authority representatives, for them to call on the Serb population, those still living in Kosovo and expellees alike, to participate in the elections. A unified position of Serbs was in a way adequate to Steiner's offer itself - Serbs should participate in the elections where elementary security is existing. That is what happened. In the five municipalities where Serbs were the majority (Leposavic, Zubin Potok, Novo Brdo, Zvecan and Strpce), they responded to this and won enough seats in the assemblies to allow them to form the municipal authority there. Where they represented the minority, Serbs participated in the elections pretty modestly. This was essentially enough to express their security index.

If Steiner had been ready to accept this exact fact (that percentage of the Serb participation in the elections equals the security index of the Serb population under his administration), he would not have expressed his vengeful reactions immediately after the preliminary results were proclaimed. He
immediately cancelled the meeting with the political representatives on realizing his bait-offer. Like an angry fisherman who failed to catch a trophy and decided to break the fishing rod. However, he did not break it but only threw it aside.

To get out of a bad endless cycle
After the municipal elections, Kosovo and Metohija remained what it was - a very sick organism, which, as such, became resistant to medications coming from the outside, i.e., the international administration's activities. With Michael Steiner, it has finally become part of this difficult problem. Three and half years was not enough to at least start the return of IDPs, to create the elementary security conditions for the minorities, to initiate a real decentralization of authority and to start to decriminalize the society. Its presence only has the purpose of deterring the worst and pretty numerous physical attempts by the extremists to finally cleanse the territory of Serbs and take over their property in one way or the other. Self-blocked in this utopian ambition to create a democratic and multiethnic Kosovo, the international administration is only giving another proof of its bad and endless presence in this region. In such a situation, a line of least resistance and gradual giving in to demands of the majority has become more realistic, as well as factual acceptance of their project of independence. From this realistic point of view, they searched for the problem and miraculously found it on the weaker side, in the resistance of the Serb population, turning, at one point, northern Mitrovica into the biggest problem that the international community had in Kosovo.

Steiner's announcement, dated October 21, regardless to its previous function to serve as bait, was the last chance that UNMIK reluctantly gave itself to, more or less, tackle the real issue. This has nothing to do with decentralizing one system in order to function better. It is about securing relatively free space and elementary living conditions, for a continuously terrorized community - to work, to get education, healthcare, to satisfy its basic social and cultural needs and to have its physical safety. After three and a half years it is quite clear that Kosovo and Metohija should be, not only decentralized, but regionalized as well, if its autochthon Serb population is supposed to survive there at all. The decision upon this, which must be brought by the international community, implies, as a necessary consequence, a form in which it could be realized - institutionalized guarantees for the Serbian community and territorial self-administration in a space as clearly defined as possible. This looks like the only sustainable concept of a multiethnic Kosovo. Everything else is nothing but deluding itself and others, without consequences for itself, but with catastrophic consequences for the other side. According to this, the overall policy of the international community could be important for the Serb community in Kosovo and Metohija, but only if concentrated on the three themes: returns of IDPs, decentralization leading to regionalization, and reconstructing and preserving the Serbian cultural monuments. The big story about democratizing a multiethnic Kosovo could be of planetary importance, but without any practical value for everyone who would be forced to run away from this Promised Land.

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Why are there so many emotions between Kosovars and Solana (Koha Ditore)

Koha Ditore carries a commentary by its Brussels correspondent, Augustin Palokaj, who writes that 'the fact that Solana is considered a friend of the Kosovars doesn't mean that the Kosovars can expect him to fight for the independence of Kosovo, but neither can Solana expect Albanians to give up on independence for his sake'. Palokaj writes:

Even though the 20-year sentence for Javier Solana still remains in effect after regime changes took place in Belgrade, the senior EU representative, known more to Serbs as 'Satana-Solana, has nevertheless visited Belgrade. It was a visit that proved that Solana is really a courageous politician.

At the time, during a press briefing in Belgrade, they asked Solana how he explained the fact that he is so hated in Serbia, to which he replied, 'It goes with my salary.'

The hatred of Serbs and Macedonians for Solana didn't break his commitment, who only timed his visits to Belgrade and Skopje to move forward EU policy.

Due to his energy, Solana is called the most charismatic European politician today. Until recently, his current position was under the shadow of his previous post as NATO Secretary General.
Kosovo and Solana's career
Kosovo has a special place in Solana's career, in his political successes, but also surely in his feelings which he hasn't hid very often. Solana was head of NATO when the order had to be given to strike Milosevic's forces after all efforts to find a political solution had failed. The night of 24 March 199 must have been a difficult moment in Solana's life. But before this Solana had himself gone to meet with Milosevic. According to General Wesley Clark, Solana is one of those rare Western politicians with whom Milosevic couldn't play the cat and mouse game and he couldn't deceive him. The fact that he gave the order for NATO air raids made Solana a savior in the eyes of Kosovar Albanians, because Kosovars say that the 24 March is one of the happiest days of their lives.

During the air raids, Solana visited Albanian refugees in Macedonia and Albania and promised them that they would return to their homes. Solana said the happiest day of his life was when he visited Prishtina in June 1999 and met with people whom he had seen in Stenkovec camps in Macedonia. The fact that he saw those people happy and free in their own country put tears in his eyes. This was a sign that Solana's relations with Kosovo and Kosovars bring positive emotions. But at the moment Albanians were returning to their homes, Solana tried to convince them not to take revenge on the Serbs. "No one has the right to ask you to forget what happened to you but I ask you to forgive," Solana told Kosovars. "They should fly higher and not become like those who committed crimes against you."

Slowly, Solana was disappointed by some of the actions of Kosovars; and there were cases when Kosovar leaders didn't show up for meetings with him.

Why Kosovars are now disappointed with Solana
Solana's work in the EU and his engagement in the Balkans reached a point where he has realized the success or the failure of the EU stance. And this stance is that the Union of Serbia and Montenegro should be preserved by all means. Solana was the one who convinced Belgrade and Podgorica to try to live together for another three years, to create a new union and not be divided. Solana had even signed an agreement that would preserve the union. And that signature made the Kosovars see Solana as a person who works against their interests. Although Solana reiterated that the Serbia-Montenegro Agreement has no legal consequences for Kosovo's final status and doesn't prejudge it, the wording that 'in case of partition, Serbia takes over the obligations of Resolution 1244' could have led to the situation in which the preamble of the Constitutional Charter mentions Kosovo as part of Serbia. Solana again says that this has no consequences, but now Kosovars, who had even gone to the extremes by considering Solana as their friend, are now seeing him as an opponent of their interests. The reason for this is Solana's frequent visits to Belgrade, Podgorica and Skopje, while he hasn't paid a visit to Kosovo for over a year. Solana has in fact become a target of attacks in Kosovar media and by politicians. The fact that Solana is considered a friend of the Kosovars doesn't mean that the Kosovars can expect him to fight for the independence of Kosovo, but neither can Solana can expect Albanians to give up on independence for his sake.

Kosovars will continue to work for independence, whereas Solana will continue to apply the policies of the EU. Even friends sometimes have opposite interests and that doesn't mean that they have to ruin their friendship. Solana does what he is appointed to do. His personal opinions are really not that important. The important things is the stance of the EU, which Solana personalizes and he works for his salary, which is normal in the present-day Western world which we want to join, even though there is a lot of passion in one's work.

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Shala: Without money and dissatisfied (Zëri)

Zëri carries an editorial by Blerim Shala who says that as things stand, higher education is a closed circle. Shala thinks that much more should be done to make those involved aware that sacrifices should be accepted.

They say that the dissatisfaction of those involved in a process with a proffered solution is a proof that really requires the stamp of compromise. This is how, on the first sight, the last proposal (I wonder) would look for the participation of students at the university. For the university teachers, the amount offered is small and doesn't promise great changes to their standards. For the majority of the students, the proposed amount is too high, and it means troubles for their families. Both teachers and students are dissatisfied with the quality of studies and expect great changes.

Teachers would say that there couldn't be better quality with the present salaries.

We know this, but we are not able to pay as much, students would reply.
Finally, it appears that a new strike, of students, is announced, who simply claim that they are not able to pay for their studies.

Theoretically speaking, there is no way out of this circle where everyone is dissatisfied.

There cannot be a university without teachers and students, without money and good quality. Without much better higher education, Kosovar society cannot be expected to strengthen and stabilize.

These are all well-known facts. But too little has been done to create an atmosphere where all those involved in the process would understand what should be done and why sacrifices are required. As things stand at the moment, we would face an insoluble confrontation.

The confusions of UNMIK spokeswoman Susan Manuel (Zëri)

Susan Manuel is a veteran representative of UNMIK in the post of spokesperson. She came to Kosovo in the first days of the deployment of the UNMIK administration, together with Sergio De Mello, the famous Brazilian diplomat, who was to open the mission in Prishtina. Now Manuel is leaving Kosovo. As can be expected in such circumstances, many in the media wanted to hear her story about her long stay in Kosovo. Manuel gave interviews to Albanian and Serbian media, such as Vecernje Novosti.

We have decided to publish her interview for Zëri along with the interview that she gave to the Belgrade-based daily paper. We are doing so in order to show the huge differences in Manuel's appearances in Albanian and Serbian media, something that should not happen to spokespersons, who should be objective, unbiased and represent the official line of the institution they represent, UNMIK, in this case. In the interview she gave to the Belgrade paper, Manuel took biased positions, problematic and in opposition to the line of UNMIK and its chief, Michael Steiner.

Therefore, Kosovar readers now realise that a person who wrote letters to US Congressmen objecting to the NATO air campaign was working as the spokesperson for UNMIK. Someone who took such a stance couldn't have been an objective spokesperson in Kosovo in a mission that was, first of all, a consequence of the NATO air campaign.

In this interview, Spokeswoman Manuel doubts the achievements of Kosovars and UNMIK in improving the situation in Kosovo, a conclusion that ties UNMIK with EU, UN and NATO officials. In the end, Manuel follows 'with irony' the aspirations of Albanians for the independence of Kosovo and confirms the mutually exclusive relationship between the independence of Kosovo and its multiethnicity. In this interview, Manuel even supports the stances of the Swedish diplomat Karl Bildt, even though it is known that UNMIK chief Steiner is opposed to Bildt's approach.

We don't know what Manuel's reaction will be after this interview is published…but we do know that it has damaged Michael Steiner, UNMIK and the Kosovars. Manuel will now be chief of the Section for Peace and Security within the UN Public Information Sector. Thus, she will have a very important post.

The weight of this post, we must say, is in huge disproportion to her objectivity.

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I have never knowingly lied, says Manuel in the end of her mission (Zëri)

The 'S' family from Taslixhe [a Prishtina neighborhood] will have to make place an advertisement for an apartment for rent to internationals, because after three years, the occupant of the apartment, who had some very nice words for the family, has left. Susan Manuel is leaving Kosovo… After a party held Saturday night in a pub in Prishtina, she has no more obligations as an international staff member of UNMIK.

As for every other international in Kosovo, power and water are the worst memories that Susan Manuel has of Kosovo. "People here are peaceful. I have never walked around with bodyguards. I have walked and taken a cab just like other Albanians in Prishtina," she said.

Manuel - the spokeswoman that praises Prime Minister Rexhepi and admires Rada Trajkovic's and Hashim Thaçi's hair
For the first time in many years, Susan Manuel will meet her family in the US. She likes Rada Trajkovic's hair. She also likes Hashim Thaçi's hair and 'there is nothing bad about this'. The politician that has impressed her the most in Kosovo is Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi, whom, she says, is a 'a politician of world-caliber' and 'knows how to behave in Kosovo and on the outside.'

With a long experience in UN missions, Susan Manuel would deserve an intern award of this organization. Her traveling for the good of the United Nations started in Cambodia in 1992. Two years later, she started her Balkans career. First in Croatia, then Bosnia, Serbia and, in the end, in Kosovo. Her mother, sister and two brothers will now be closer to the single Susan. After a week, she will start work at UN HQ in New York, as chief of an office of public information.

Touching her hair with her right hand always showed the nervousness of Susan Manuel during questions from journalists. She was communicative when UNMIK was administrated by Bernard Kouchner; became rather silent regarding details when Hans Haekkerup came to Kosovo, and was very careful as of February this year when Michael Steiner was appointed chief of UNMIK. The German is proving to be very close to the media but it is said that every morning he inspects how his spokespersons are quoted in the papers. This proves how different were the three chief administrators of Kosovo who came from the same organization (the UN).

"They were all different from each other, but Kouchner and Steiner were closer to the media and the public. They believed in launching their agendas through public diplomacy. Kouchner was not so much criticized by the locals but by internationals that thought that he was only interested in showing up before the cameras," Manuel was quoted as saying. Only after some time did she discover that this was the French doctor's 'formula' to achieve something and to attract the people's attention to an issue in a Kosovo that was overwhelmed by the euphoria of being free.

"Steiner is very similar to Kouchner in this respect, but he is more precise, because he thinks more about how this whole thing must look to the public. He is more involved in details than Kouchner. Even in the international arena, if you work backstage there can be certain consequences," says Manuel.

On the other hand, former UNMIK chief Hans Haekkerup, by a combination of his personality and philosophy, was 'completely reclusive and hesitant'.

"He didn't believe in Kouchner's public appearances. The public and the media were hasty in making judgments about Haekkerup. He didn't understand that a part of his job here was being close to people," she said. It wasn't just difficult but absolutely impossible to hear such words from Susan Manuel when Haekkerup was in Kosovo.

"You can notice that when Steiner makes a controversial decision in the eyes of the public, he goes out in public; he goes out, he goes to northern Mitrovica and people are, in fact, happy when they see him there," she says, adding that Michael Steiner knows that one must talk to the people and that he does so regularly.

The office of the former spokeswoman remains empty and awaits the new person who will replace her. Manuel does not know who this will be. No one can say whether the new name can defend the cause of the UN in Kosovo.

Susan Manuel first came to Kosovo in June 1999. When Yugoslav police and army were leaving Kosovo, she met in Skopje with the team of Sergio Vieira De Mello, the first international administrator of Kosovo, who didn't stay here more than three weeks. Chosen for the post of the UN spokeswoman by Kofi Annan, she joined De Mello's team. She came to Kosovo to stay only for a short while, because the UN was not aware of her 'virtues' as a spokeswoman.

"There were plans to appoint a senior UN official, but I remained in the post," said Manuel, who had been working for the World Food Programme in Albania at a time when hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees were forced to flee Kosovo during the spring of 1999.

How to arrive in Kosovo, what should be done first? As the first step, Susan Manuel proposed that a UN flag should be secured and put at the top of a building in Prishtina to mark the beginning of the work of the international administration.

"We had nothing with us. I went to the office of the UN Director in Skopje and stole a UN flag because we needed one in Prishtina. Returning from Skopje to Prishtina, people had already started returning and they were greeting us. There was a chaotic situation in Prishtina… I remember that there were around 2,500 journalists here. KFOR was deployed in Grand Hotel. They had money and they had rented a conference room for journalists by paying 1,500 DM per day. They talked to journalists everyday, whereas I was alone, and this whole thing was terrible, houses were still being burned, there were still murders, theft," Manuel describes the first days of her stay in Kosovo.

As many Kosovars remember, the first winter was very cold and there was no electricity. "I can honestly say that UNMIK officials still haven't thought about this issue seriously. I don't know what is the truth with the power situation here, but in August 1999 there were promises from the EU that x million dollars would be invested and that there would be power by the end of the year. I don't know what ever happened with those funds," added Manuel.

"People were returning from refugee camps and going out in Prishtina to celebrate by shooting and singing. Albanians were either shooting at Serbs or in the air out of joy, but not at us internationals, because they admired us. They were happy when they saw us, especially when they saw KFOR," reminisces Manuel.

As every international that goes to a country for the first time, Susan Manuel didn't have much information about the circumstances and the history of Kosovo. What she remembers most often and makes her laugh is when the Youth and Sports Center in Prishtina was burned in January 2000. She had to write a press release and in it she had used the old name of the center (Boro e Ramizi). But it had never crossed her mind that Boro and Ramizi were names from World War Two. Giving background information to her press release, Manuel had written that 'the center bears the name in the honor of two Kosovar athletes (one is a Serb and the other is an Albanian)'!

"People do not understand that a spokesperson is only a servant or a member of the staff of the SRSG and I never make policy or statements. Sometimes you are forced to say things you don't want or you think are not right," said Manuel.

Who knows what was under her skin when she was forced to practice what she preached; nonetheless, she said she is leaving Kosovo with a clear conscience. "I never knowingly lied. This is not about lying, but I have lied a lot of times and didn't know that I was lying because I was told to make those statements in the name of UNMIK!"

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Susan Manuel's interview to Vecernje Novosti (Vecernje Novosti)

Zëri carries an interview that UNMIK spokeswoman Susan Manuel gave to Belgrade-based daily newspaper Vecernje Novosti.

When did you first arrive in Yugoslavia from the US?
My life in the Balkans began in 1994 when I came to Croatia, to Slavonia. I stayed there for about a year. Then I stayed in Bosnia for about two months, and then I spent two and a half years in Belgrade, from where I went to Pakistan. It was very difficult for me to leave Belgrade. I was in a depressive mood because I was leaving a town with which I was linked emotionally.

Not much time passed before air raids started over Yugoslavia and Belgrade. How did you perceive them?
When the air raids began, I talked to friends in your country and I encouraged them. I wrote letters to US Congressmen opposing the bombing. In April, I was sent to Macedonia where I saw refugees from Kosovo crossing the Albanian border every day. It was a very weird situation. During the day, I saw people crossing the border, whereas during nighttime I saw planes that were going to bomb Serbia. For me, it was a feeling of mixed emotions. Then I got a call from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who told me to go to Kosovo as the first spokesperson of the UN.

When did you arrive in Kosovo and what were your first impressions?
I arrived here on 13 June 1999, but a week later I was replaced. However, I again became a spokesperson for the organization I still work for. My first impressions here were very confusing. The houses of Serbs and Roma were being burned everywhere; I even saw corpses on the street. A huge number of journalists arrived in Prishtina and they were all staying in Grand Hotel. There was no water, no power; life was simply difficult. It is difficult to talk about that period because everything was chaotic. Albanians were returning to their homes, they were throwing fireworks, celebrating all night. They were very happy. This was beautiful, but they were also killing people. I remember that there were a few Serbs who lived in the center of Prishtina and who were protected by UNMIK Police. They withstood pressure from the majority for a certain period of time, but then they were forced to flee.

Do you recall any events that happened at that time in Kosovo?
I remember the massacre in Gaçkë, a village near Lipjan. It was July 1999 when 14 Serbs were killed in their fields. I also remember the time when a Bulgarian was killed in the center of Prishtina…only because someone had asked him the time and he had answered in Serbian. He was attacked by a mob. I also remember the outrageous murder of Professor Balic, when a similar situation took place.

Was it possible to prevent those things from happening?
As UNMIK, we were responsible, but at the same time we powerless because those people were attacked by a mob. In due time, the situation changed, but it also came to a complete division between communities. Therefore, I'm not very certain that we have achieved progress in changing the situation. For example, the University of Prishtina is working, but there are no students of national minorities attending classes there. Slavic languages are not taught at the university, not even Russian. There is a hospital where only Albanians are treated, and others do not dare go there. There are Serb enclaves but Serbs still lack freedom of movement. I think that the situation in this respect will change when Serbs get their Kosovar license plates. Some people say that it is much better here, but I'm not sure that they are telling the truth.

Could you have done more to protect Serbs and their return to their homes?
I think that the return of Serbs could have been encouraged more. I remember a case when Ashkalis returning to their homes were killed. This crime outraged the international community. We feared that something similar would take place. I think that many of us, including even KFOR, should have intervened before certain events took place, for example, before the deaths of passengers on the Nis Express bus near Podujevo. KFOR intelligence might have anticipated that something like this would happen, perhaps not on that day, but they should have found the perpetrators. In the end, I think we could have done more, but I am not quite sure in what way.

KFOR is justifying the removal of checkpoints and the reduction of troops in Kosovo with claims that the security situation is improving. However, it is a fact that Serbs here are still not safe.
Two years ago, there were over 40,000 soldiers in Kosovo, now there are 30,000. The withdrawal of troops is directly linked to the policies of the countries they come from. In order to justify the withdrawal of their troops, they must say that the security situation is better and they justify this with statistics. For example, the decrease in the number of murders. But Serbs can refute them and say that, yes, there are fewer murders, because we are living in enclaves. Albanian political leaders can help a lot with the security situation. They should call for tolerance, understanding and a commonality of life.

What is your vision of Kosovo and Metohija in the future?
I think that UNMIK and some individuals, such as Prime Minister Rexhepi, have very good intentions and want multiethnicity, but the irony is that Albanians desperately want an independent Kosovo. It is difficult to say what will prevail. We are currently in the phase of forming judgments where people are part of a political solution. Perhaps that is why some people think we are working for the Albanians, but the international community is working for a multiethnic Kosovo. But I don't know whether it will be like this. This is why there should be a neutral government that would prove its neutrality in practice.

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Belgrade Update

New countries to be created in Balkans, says Martin Sletzinger (Vecernje Novosti)
The director of Southeastern European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Institute in Washington, Dr. Martin Sletzinger, says that he expects new countries to be created in the Balkans.

"Sooner or later, it is inevitable that Kosovo will secede from Serbia. The question remains, is it going to be an independent Kosovo, an international protectorate, or a factor in creating a "Greater Albania". On the other hand, I do not see why would we destroy "Greater Serbia" and "Greater Croatia" just to create a "Greater Albania". It is not more stable or more sustainable, morally. That is why we are going to have two or more Albanian entities in Europe. I do not see a way for Bosnia and Herzegovina to survive, but I do not see a way for it to break up, either. Throughout almost its entire history, Bosnia has been part of greater entities, and now it is alone. You have a situation there in which Serbs, Croats and Muslims who could not live together in Yugoslavia, now must live together in Bosnia. This situation is hardly sustainable, but I don't see an alternative, at least not in the near future," he told Vecernje Novosti.

Steiner criticized for opposing the partition of Kosovo (Beta/Zeri)
The Pristina-based daily, Zeri, claims that certain Western circles have criticized UNMIK chief Michael Steiner for his opposition to the partition of Kosovo, as being the "only fair solution for the province." "Steiner was also criticized for his action dynamic which is much faster than the dynamic that the UN administration was suppose to act upon. However, any solution is unthinkable without the leading role of the US, which is currently focused on disarming Iraq," writes Zeri.

Regional Update

Meta: Why do I go to Belgrade? (Kosova Sot)
Kosova Sot quotes Albanian Minister for Foreign Affairs Ilir Meta as saying 'the visit aims to make Tirana-Belgrade relations more effective for stability of the region'. He further added that this visit aims to intensify relations, identifying areas of cooperation where a clear agenda of signing agreements could be established.

Could armed groups be reorganized? (Kosova Sot)
This daily reports that director of the Balkans project of International Crisis Group (ICG), Nicholas Wiles, said that based on the present situation in the field, international presence in Macedonia is necessary. This group considers that the danger for armed groups to reorganize still exists, reports Kosova Sot. Wiles said that the aim is not to establish a new protectorate, but a stable Macedonia, which could be integrated as a partner in NATO and EU.

The marking of the disputed borderline with Kosovo begins (Koha Ditore)
Koha reports that Macedonian Foreign Minister Ilinka Mitreva said that demarcation of the borderline is being completed based on an agreement signed last year between Macedonia and FRY. She said Macedonia is determined to mark the borderline with Kosovo within the next two years.

Zëri quotes YU Foreign Minister Svilanovic as saying that if we have to mark the Macedonia-Kosovo borderline, UNMIK would join talks.

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No 'lion' has been demobilized (Koha Ditore)
This daily says that the new leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has only reduced the number of reserve policemen. Despite all the international pressure and the announcements by Macedonian officials, dissolution of the 'Lions' hasn't happen, says Koha.