04 December 2002, Wednesday Edition

CONTENTS

Take your fate in your own hands (Zëri)

Zëri published the following letter from an unnamed western diplomat who has reportedly been much involved in the efforts of the West to resolve the Kosovo issue.

I am one of the western diplomats who have tried to get familiar with your history and I understand your aspirations, the aspirations of Kosovar Albanians. In my studies, I observed that Kosovo is one of the issues that wasn't resolved after the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans. In the years after the downfall of communism, similar to my colleagues, I had thought that the democratization of Yugoslavia would create more suitable circumstances for you and for Kosovo. We all saw that this was an illusion. After communism, in multiethnic communist countries such as Yugoslavia, first comes nationalism and then democracy. The national self-determination was the key issue of that period, and not the creation of a genuine democratic system.

The conflict of Serb nationalism with state-forming nationalisms, other national movements outside Serbia, brought a war with tragic consequences. In my opinion, you, in Kosovo, made a good choice at the beginning of this war.

In the first years of the war in Croatia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we in the West didn't react properly. Our reaction was rightfully perceived as 'too little and too late'.

After the Dayton Conference, I was one of the diplomats who insisted on concrete political steps to initiate the process of resolving the issue of Kosovo. I want to be very honest with you, I must add that no one at that time, I am talking about official circles in the West, thought the independence of Kosovo was a solution. The majority of us favored political autonomy, which was more or less what you used to have. Few thought that the time of autonomy had passed and that Kosovo should become a republic within the federation of that time. I belonged to the second group. I was also in the minority when I warned about the danger of a conflict escalating in Kosovo.

There were some arguments that suited my point of warning about the consequences of a new conflict in Kosovo. On the one hand, it could pose a danger to the fragile post-Dayton peace process in Bosnia. On the other hand, it was known that Macedonia was not stabilized as a country and that an eventual conflict in Kosovo would have grave consequences for the stability of the entire region.

Despite growing armed incidents in Kosovo, most western politicians thought that Milosevic and his regime, who were acting as our partners in protecting peace in Bosnia, would turn the process backwards with another war in a territory they considered part of their state.

When the conflict in Kosovo began, it was clear that Milosevic hadn't changed. But now we started changing. After a late reaction in Bosnia, we knew that we had to do a lot more in the case of Kosovo. However, I don't know whether you realize that the NATO military intervention was a consequence of two key moments:

First, Milosevic with his actions left us no other choice. He refused all of our proposals prior, during and after the Rambouillet Conference. The level of crimes committed by his forces in Kosovo left no room for second thoughts.

Second, there were some western personalities who were capable of taking over the political burden of justifying a military intervention. Without US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and without NATO Commander General Wesley Clark, we would not have intervened in Kosovo.

But, in general, the hatred toward Milosevic, the public pressure to stop crimes committed in Kosovo and the love for you were forces that stimulated our intervention. We didn't know what would happen with postwar Kosovo. But we did know that we had to stop the war and crimes in Kosovo. It was a humanitarian intervention, and not intervention to establish justice in Kosovo.

Many things have happened in the meantime. The region and the world have changed. Many people in the West don't even wish to recall NATO's intervention in Kosovo. They take this as a precedent, as an unwanted child. I must tell you frankly that postwar events in Kosovo have contributed to this conclusion. Your image has suffered a lot of damage. You must know this.

In the West, they don't know what to do with you and Kosovo. In Brussels, for example, the European Union has no strategy on how to resolve the issue of Kosovo. Nonetheless, few are those who think that Kosovo should return to a joint state with Serbia. But even fewer are those who think that Kosovo should be independent. In the end, the fewest are the veteran western diplomats who are still in the region and who know what has happened in Kosovo, Bosnia and elsewhere.

Reading reports and telegrams and direct participation in events are very different.

I want to say that many people have forgotten about the crimes committed in Kosovo before and during the war. But almost no one has forgotten that NATO intervened in Kosovo for you. Amongst them there are diplomats with a guilty conscience, and even fewer are those who think that this was a right move.

I want to be completely honest with you. It seems that you do not understand the consequences of changes that have taken place in the region and world. Milosevic is no longer in power in Belgrade, General Clark is no longer NATO commander, Ms. Albright is no longer US Secretary of State in Washington. The fight against terrorism and the disarmament of Iraq are the absolute priorities of the Bush administration. In Western Europe, the European Union doesn't have the willingness to essentially deal with Kosovo's final status. Great Britain is caught up in the alliance with the US; Germany and France will hardly play a leading role given the historical consequences of their engagements in the Balkans. All this makes me be surprised with your insistence for international mediation in resolving Kosovo's final status. Where do you get the security that this mediation will result in the independence of Kosovo? You insist on independence, while the Serb side insists on autonomy. Mediation might lead to grave compromises for you. Furthermore, the idea of the territorial division of Kosovo are supported by many of my colleagues in Belgrade and Brussels. Division is also considered as a compromise.

You should decide what you want. If you desperately and immediately want independence, then you could find supporters for this if you give up on northern Kosovo, including northern Mitrovica. However, if you are aiming for independence in the current borders of Kosovo, then you must work more and convince the West that you deserve independence. You should take your fate in your own hands. This means that you should be more active in respecting the rights of Serbs in Kosovo. I know that Belgrade will continue to manipulate Kosovo Serbs. A success of Kosovo is a failure of Serbia and its plans, which in one way or another oppose the independence of Kosovo. But you must do your homework. You must prove that the independence of Kosovo and Serbs remaining in Kosovo are not two contradictory issues. Furthermore, you should also prove that the independence of Kosovo and the further existence of Macedonia are in full accord, that Kosovo as a state has its meaning in ending the crisis in the Balkans and not raising the Albanian issue with the insistence of creating an ethnic Albanian country.

My main message would be that you must make the state of Kosovo a reality if you want that state to be recognized by the West. The state of Kosovo must be a fait accompli. Otherwise, if you leave things pending, as they are now, it will be a big surprise to me if you manage to implement your political will.

As far as I know, this is the first time in history that you are able to decide your own fate. Believe me, it is also the last.

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Steiner's Administrative Directive to be debated at Mitrovica MA (Koha)

The Mitrovica Municipal Assembly will hold an extraordinary meeting in December regarding the situation created by UNMIK Administrative Directive nr. 2000/26 on the responsibilities and UNMIK administrative government in northern part of Mitrovica, signed by Kosovo's chief administrator Michael Steiner on 25 November.

This was decided at the third regular meeting of Mitrovica MA, reports and Koha Ditore quotes an MA information official as saying the decision to add a debate on Michael Steiner directive had been 'unanimously approved'.

Koha Ditore interprets Steiner's directive as meaning expansion of UNMIK government into the northern part of the city, while temporarily dismissing the competencies of Mitrovica MA. According to municipal advisors from the three major parties, this issue is of a great importance for Mitrovica and should be thoroughly discussed. They also stressed that UNMIK administrator for Mitrovica John Rogers should be asked for detailed information on this issue.

Koha Ditore reports that MA deputies also established two committees for Finance and Politics, and nominated their members, while the Committees for Communities and Mediation are to be established at next MA meeting.

Baraybar: There are no hostages alive in Serbia (Koha Ditore)

Chief of the UNMIK missing persons office, Jose Pablo Baraybar, meeting with the mothers of kidnapped persons from Gjakova Municipality, reportedly said that there are 'no hostages alive in Serbia'. He said this was his opinion and he did not cite sources from any other institution or from Serbia, according to Koha Ditore.

Koha Ditore says this news shocked many of the mothers present and some of them left the meeting. They say they cannot give up hope that at least some of their sons are kept somewhere in Serbia. Some of the mothers told Baraybar that the issue of the kidnapped is being used by Belgrade to blackmail the return of displaced Serbs to Kosovo.

Baraybar, who says he comes from a state that has around ten thousand people missing, said that he has been in continuous contact with senior officials in Belgrade and that they meet twice each month.

Baraybar's meeting with the mothers of the missing comes after UN SG Kofi Annan promise a representative of the association, Nysrete Kumnova, that he would increase the engagement and hasten the solution of this problem. 'In the meeting in Prishtina, Kofi Annan promised to us that he would go to Belgrade and that he would ask President Kostunica for precise information and serious engagement,' Kumnova was quoted as saying.

Regarding kidnapped persons in Meje, from the well known massacre of 27 April 1999, Baraybar said that most of the bodies could be found in Batajnica and that, after identification, they will be returned in Kosovo. He said other bodies could be found in the northern part of Mitrovica or Petrovo Selo and that they are working to identify these individuals.

Baraybar promised to the mothers from Gjakova that he would be seriously engaged in the full enlightenment of the fate of their sons, reports Koha Ditore.

Rexhep Boja talks about the true face of UNMIK (Epoka e Re)

Epoka e Re carries a front-page interview with Rexhep Boja, chairman of the Kosovo Islamic Community, in which he talks about his relations with UNMIK.

Asked to comment on the cooperation between the Islamic Community and local and international institutions, Boja said they have good relations with local institutions and KFOR, but not with UNMIK. 'We've had meetings with KFOR generals with whom we talked about the issue of Kosovo and we thanked them for the security they maintain. But at the same time we have also asked them to provide even greater assistance to the stabilization of Kosovo. As for relations with UNMIK, I can say our relations with them have not been the same. No administrator has found the time to visit us so far,' he said.

Boja claimed that certain structures within UNMIK don't have the best opinion about the Islamic Community. 'It is so, because they never found the time to visit me as the chairman of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, while they visit Gracanica or similar places almost every month. We cannot interfere in their work…we have met with them at various events and we have welcomed them but they never found time to pay us a visit. In fact, we haven't received any response to the request we sent to UNMIK to have our status as religious community recognized by UNMIK,' he added.

Boja told Epoka e Re that he still hasn't received his UNMIK passport even two and a half months after applying. 'The way I see it, this is some kind of avoidance… God knows what they might be thinking, but we still respect and honor them. As long as the people honor them, so will we, but the respect should be mutual,' he said.

Boja said that while many organizations have come to Kosovo since the war with allegedly humane goals, 'UNMIK should be responsible for those organizations'.

He further said that the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US had not ruined the good relations between the Islamic Community and the Americans. 'We still have the good relations that we had with the US Office even before the war,' said Boja.

In several daily paper's today, Reno Harnish, head of the US Office in Prishtina, was quoted as saying at a special Ramadan dinner, 'Religious leaders in Kosovo and elsewhere have huge moral authority that can be used either for good or evil purposes. The Islamic leadership in Kosovo chose the first and by doing so, it proved that Muslims in Kosovo and citizens of the US have these two important values in common of respecting diversity and tolerance.'

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Crisis in public services (Zëri)

Zëri carried an editorial by its publisher Blerim Shala, who says that public services in Kosovo are facing a serious crisis; and he warns that less devoted people will serve the citizens and the government in the future.

The director of the Kosovo Customs Services has resigned. It is not clear who is leading PTK because of the well-known history of two of its three main directors. KEK is in approximately the same situation, never mind the arrests and trial processes against some important officials in the public services. The latest affair is connected to the Public Housing Enterprise.

This quick picture tells a lot about the situation in Kosovo's public section.

They say that since the first democracy in ancient Athens, the success of democracy depended, more than anything else, on the quality of the public services, starting with the state clerk. Success of a government depends precisely on the quality of this service.

To us in Kosovo, our history so far is full of misunderstandings of the role of the public servant. Privileges, mistreatment, profit, and wealth are connected with his duty, not responsibility. Things have naturally changed in Kosovo since the war. After all, the international community and we want to create a public service at the western level. All right, the salaries are far from that level (except for a few enterprises), there are many troubles; to work in public service you would have more threats and problems than advantages. Nevertheless, many affairs, rumors, but also indictments for corruption and miscarriage of the duty tell that we are facing serious crisis.

It appears that in future we will have less devoted people ready to serve the citizens and government.

Enterprise owes 275,000 euros to the municipality (Koha Ditore)

Koha Ditore reports that the Public Housing Enterprise, which is already suspected of corruption by the UNMIK Police, has not fulfilled this year's obligations to Prishtina MA in the amount of 275,000 euros.

This enterprise has allegedly used municipal property, without paying a cent of rent, say Prishtina municipal officials.

"We have prepared the bill for 2002, which determines rental obligations of this enterprise for 22,954 square meters of land. The total rental obligation is 275,448 euros," Rrahim Krasniqi, director of Prishtina MA finances, was quoted as saying. He added that this enterprise also owes DM20,000 from last year.

UNMIK Police spokesperson Derek Chappell said that there is evidence that supports the suspicion that there is corruption at this enterprise, but 'we have to wait several months until the investigation is completed'.

This daily reports that UNMIK Police took action on 30 November in cooperation with the international prosecution office, Prishtina MA and the KTA, based on information that came out during investigations of corruption activities in Prishtina, says Koha Ditore.

Chappell said that so far only the director of this enterprise, Nexhmedin Sherifi, had been dismissed. "Among other issues, it was discovered that this enterprise has registered as a private business, held funds in the bank and didn't pay its obligations for three years," Chappell was quoted as saying.

Ex-administrator Ivo Sanc had said that there was corruption at Public Housing Enterprise seven or eight months ago, says Koha Ditore, adding that Sanc had verified that this enterprise was not paying what it owed to Prishtina MA.

Despite nonfulfillment of its obligations to Prishtina MA, Simon Augustini, director of the Directory for Transport and Public Services was quoted as saying, "I don't know whether there is corruption at this enterprise or not since it has been under KTA supervision since June 2002. It is up to investigating organs to consider whether there is corruption there or not."

Police have blocked the Public Housing Enterprise building since Saturday and they continue to confiscate materials and different documents that concern the financial situation of this enterprise, says Koha Ditore.

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Interview with former COMKFOR General Klaus Reinhardt (Koha Ditore)

Koha Ditore carries an interview with Klaus Reinhardt, the former commander of KFOR peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, in which he reportedly refused to talk about his recent meetings in Kosovo. Reinhardt said the sole purpose of his visit to Kosovo was that he is godfather to an Albanian child.

'These were not official visits. These were only visits to some friends and some of your political leaders have become my friends and I only wanted to say 'hello' and see how things are going. However, we didn't talk about the issues the way I wanted,' said Reinhardt.

Reinhardt told Koha Ditore that he was now working as advisor to The Hague tribunal on military issues and added 'that they don't take any action until they have very clear evidence'.

'I would say that if something comes from The Hague this shouldn't be perceived as an evil and mysterious conspiracy against Kosovo… I recall talking to Carla Del Ponte when I was here regarding some accusations that had appeared in the press at that time. Nothing was proven to be true and maybe you remember that I always supported KPC leaders and said that until anything is proven to be true, everything is OK. However, if something has happened, then it should be investigated,' he said.

Asked to comment on the biggest challenges during his service in Kosovo, Reinhardt recalled the murder of a Serb professor at the first postwar celebration of Flag Day. 'A Serb professor was driving his car in Prishtina and some people saw him and recognized him. He was in his car with his spouse and sister-in-law…taken out of his vehicle, beaten and burned and the two women were almost killed. I don't think that this would happen today. This was the darkest night for me in Kosovo, because I couldn't believe that normal people who were walking Prishtina boulevards and celebrating Flag Day for the first time could kill someone just because he was a Serb professor who had done no damage and had only asked about a street. I cannot describe how angry I was,' he added.

Commenting on the situation in Mitrovica, the former COMKFOR said the key responsibility now rests with the police force and that he hoped 'the political situation that Mr. Steiner chose will contribute to returning the city to normalcy'.

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Kosovo for NATO's third round? (Koha Ditore)

By Janusz Bugajski

Can Kosovo become a NATO member by the end of this decade? This should be the long-term objective of all political leaders in Prishtina. A decade ago, the notion of former Warsaw Pact states and any Soviet republic joining the Alliance seemed far-fetched. Now, the reachable goal of NATO accession could give both vision and direction to the aspiring state and to its stuttering reform process.

No political consensus has thus far emerged in either Washington or Brussels regarding future rounds of Alliance enlargement. However, three options are likely to evolve as the debate develops in the coming year.

First, is the opinion that enlargement has essentially stopped because the digestion of seven new members with diverse identities, strategic positions, and military capabilities will take both time and resources. Moreover, NATO is in the midst of its own modernization and retooling. Hence, the Alliance will simply not have the stomach for further growth in this decade.

The second option would consist of another combined accession, this time involving the remainder of the former Yugoslav republics plus Albania -- in other words, the often-styled "western Balkans." However, in this scenario the stronger candidates, such as Croatia, will have to wait for the weaker aspirants, including Serbia, to catch up before they themselves are granted membership.

In the third scenario envisaged, enlargement will no longer be conducted in phases or through regional groupings, but principally as a consequence of the individual merit of canvassing states. Every country will be judged strictly according to its reform successes, security efforts, and potential contributions to the evolving Alliance mission.

Kosovo should be prepared for all three scenarios and fully commit itself to NATO membership by the end of this decade. Final status and independence for the territory would then be seen as an important step in the accession process. And if indeed, NATO leaders would prefer to see a region wide entry by the "western Balkans" to eliminate south east Europe's "black hole," then Kosovo will be one of the keys both for itself and for all of its neighbors.

As Serbia develops and implements meaningful reforms, its aspirations toward NATO are also likely to grow. Otherwise, it will be surrounded by Alliance countries moving ahead with modernizing and adapting their forces, while its own military apparatus becomes increasingly obsolescent and irrelevant. However, Serbia's chances of graduating to candidate status for NATO will depend primarily on resolving its two major bilateral conflicts - with Montenegro and with Kosovo.

In terms of eligibility for the Alliance, Serbia has recently made life extremely difficult for itself by supplying sensitive military material, technology, and training to Iraq's war machine. Even Belgrade's chances for NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) have receded as a result of its complicity in the "terror international."

President Kostunica's frequent claims about "Albanian terrorism" now sound increasingly hollow and hypocritical given the clandestine activities of the Yugoslav army in support of anti-American and anti-European interests. Serbia's failings have been compounded by inadequate military reform and a lack of consistent and genuine cooperation with The Hague war crimes tribunal.

But the two most burning issues that will need to be settled before Belgrade can be considered a credible NATO candidate concern its neighbors. The Union with Montenegro has to be established and legitimized, even though the arrangement will be temporary. And discussions need to begin on the final status of Kosovo in which Serbia simply has to let go of the past and come to terms with its new southern neighbor.

Prishtina will remain a heavy stone around Belgrade's neck unless and until the Serbian leadership decides on revoking its ambitions over Kosovo. Such a practical solution to Serbia's own security aspirations must be continuously underscored by the Kosovar leadership.

The Balkans are clearly important for NATO's emerging strategies vis-à-vis the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. This was evident in Washington's overwhelming support for issuing NATO invitations to both Bulgaria and Romania despite their limited economic progress. Kosovo must also act as a reliable bridge, conduit, supporter, and contributor to future security challenges and can help to complete the gap between the Adriatic and Black Seas.

NATO and the U.S. will need doers and not only talkers in the struggles ahead. Kosovo may therefore offer contributions to various initiatives, including the planned "NATO Response Force" which is to consist of 20,000 rapidly deployable troops. Current non-membership or even non-independence should not disqualify the country from offering concrete assistance. Indeed, an ambitious approach may gain Prishtina respect and high marks in the White House.

Participation in out-of-area peacekeeping operations is a promising domain. Several current NATO contenders are already making contributions to the U.S. campaign against terror. For instance, a unit of Albanian commandos was dispatched to Afghanistan in August and offers have been made by Tirana to assist in future American missions. Albania has long conducted its foreign and security policies as though it were already a NATO member.

Kosovo should not be left behind. A focus on certain security specializations in American-led operations could bring substantial political advantages. This may include intelligence gathering and analysis, peace-support missions, emergency response, and various forms of logistical assistance. An inventory of Kosovar capabilities should be drawn up and a plan devised for adapting the Kosova Protection Corps to NATO's broader security challenges.

Washington remains skeptical about the commitment of many of its NATO allies to the anti-terror and anti-rogue state struggle. However, it has recently gained several loyal partners in Eastern Europe. And if future American-led missions will primarily involve "coalitions of the willing," then Kosovo should become one of the willing.