10 December 2002, Tuesday Edition

CONTENTS

Thaçi: Kosovo - retreat and perspective (Koha Ditore)

Koha Ditore carries a commentary by the leader of the Kosovo Democratic Party (PDK). The entire text of Thaçi's commentary is as follows:

The agreement for the new union of states in the Balkans is slowly being finalized, made official and it will probably be recognized by political decision-making international centers. The Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro will probably be endorsed in the next days by the Serbian and Montenegrin parliaments.

The final text of the preamble of the Constitutional Charter includes Kosovo, as the text says: Bearing in mind, the equality of the two member countries, Montenegro and Serbia, which also includes the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija which is currently under international administration in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Initial Basis for Reformulating Agreements between Serbia and Montenegro.'

In Kosovo there are voices that say that 'Belgrade and Podgorica can write whatever they want, but Kosovo has chosen its path towards Europe' or 'that is only a temporary solution', etc. However, not everything is like that. The issue is not as simple as it is being presented with this 'intellectual' commodity, because this is not in accordance with the legal reality and the Kosovar perception of this problem. The abovementioned formulation of the Constitutional Charter of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro is sponsored by Brussels (European Union) and it will be backed by the official Washington.

The inclusion of Kosovo (and Metohija) in this short-life union is done without respecting the will of the citizens of Kosovo, the institutions of the Assembly, Government, political parties and even without the previous consulting of the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro.

It has been emphasized that all must be equal in front of democratic criteria. While Kosovars are on a good path of implementing democratic criteria, as a precondition for resolving the final status, Belgrade, on the other hand, is still failing to respect the democratic standards in the region (recall the fresh but very dangerous affair of armament cooperation between the official Belgrade and Iraq).

By not forgetting that Belgrade is still violating human and minority rights, the legislation remains the same as during the time of the monist regime. There is no cooperation with The Hague tribunal, the authorities still orchestrate the media, and the failure to respect economy and market rules. The Serb army, police and secret services are led by the former structures that caused and led the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. This entire staff and military-technical potential is outside civil control.

Let me ask how much are countries being respected in the process of integration into western structures according to the implementation of democratic reforms? It should be emphasized that the opposite is taking place in Kosovo. Prishtina is implementing democratic reforms for the good of the country, the society, the region and integration in Brussels' structures.

On the other hand, Belgrade continues to ignore the reforms. Surprise! Various international political decision-making centers keep on disciplining Kosovars for their reactions surrounding the status, but on the other hand, they are applying pressure towards Belgrade and Podgorica to finalize the agreement for the Union which will also include Kosovo.

Surprisingly, Kosovo is first told to achieve the standards and then address the status issue, whereas Belgrade is told to first reach the agreement (status) and then standards. Kosovo and its citizens are committed and work for reforms, and for a new connection with Belgrade.

The international community recognized political status before democratic standards for Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovakia, etc. Kosovars don't fear and don't want to avoid the implementation of standards, but in Kosovo's case, there are requests not to have double criteria on standards and status.

- Prishtina and Belgrade are neither divided nor united by standards, but by status.

Kosovo was forcefully included into Serbia (1912), the Serb-Croat-Slovenian Kingdom (1918), Yugoslavia (AVNOJ 1945), and Serbia unwillingly withdrew from Kosovo in June 1999.

Today, in a time of democratic transition, Kosovo is legally being recognized as part of Serbia through a political decision, by not respecting the democratic principles and procedures of decision-making. I have emphasized that the will of citizens cannot be pressed through political decrees or declarations.

- The mini-federation for cooperation between Russia-Byelorussia and Ukraine, was also joined by Serbia during the conflict in Kosovo, and Belgrade still hasn't declared this agreement null and void. Why should Kosovo be a part of this anti-western league?! This is an insult, and it also has disciplining connotations for citizens who want Kosovo to be oriented toward the West.

According to the Constitutional Charter, the Union will rely on the principles of equality of the two member countries (Serbia and Montenegro) and its territory will be comprised of member countries which have a joint market. The Union will have its symbols, flag, anthem and the emblem and the administrative center. The Parliament and the Council of Ministers will be seated in Belgrade, a resident of the country is a resident of S&M; the Union establishes international relations with other countries; S&M decide for military and defense issues, they have an army, etc.

Kosovo can and will have trade cooperation with Belgrade and Podgorica, but it will be unacceptable for Prishtina's economy to be led by Belgrade.

Kosovo is building its state identity and it will have the anthem, the flag and the emblem, and it is unthinkable to ask a citizen of Kosovo to sing the Yugoslav anthem, in the same way as it is illogical to ask a Kosovo Serb to sing the proposed anthem for Kosovo.

A citizen of Kosovo will have the nationality of a Kosovar, and in no way the S&M nationality. Kosovo is making the first steps towards establishing international connections, and will be difficult to find an Albanian or non-Albanian citizen who could be appointed Ambassador of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The country has its own structure of defense which functions in accordance with an agreement reached with internationals, it is not realistic to expect a young Kosovar to wear a uniform and serve the police of the Serbian and Montenegrin Union.

It is far from reality to expect that Kosovar citizens (Albanian and non-Serb minorities) will participate in the elections for the Serbian-Montenegrin Parliament and to have a joint Parliament and Government, Constitution, army, police, administration, budget, etc.

- Prishtina, Podgorica and Belgrade can have their deputies in the European Parliament but in no way in an assembly seated in Belgrade.
- In present-day Belgrade, there are more supporters for Kosovo's independence than there are people in Prishtina supporting a reconnection with Serbia.
- Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia should become independent in order to have stability and democratic values.
- Kosovo is going through the first phase of independence and democratization. The idea for the complete freedom of Kosovo is not only an idea of Albanians, but also a project of the democratic world which we are jointly implementing today.
- The western world should respect rightful solutions and not unsure projects. The Union of Serbia and Montenegro can be formed, but its functioning in Kosovo will fail.
- The political concept in the Balkans should be de-Balkanized. Kosovo is geographically located in the Balkans, but in the political and cultural aspect it is oriented toward the western world. Baltic countries are geographically closer to Russia but they became independent and achieved a solid stage of democratization and were successfully integrated in north-Atlantic structures.
- The West doesn't owe anything to Belgrade for what happened in Serbia (1999 bombing).
- Kosovo should become independent and westernized and not undergo Serb-Balkanization.

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Surroi: How did Malishevë defeat Kostunica? (Koha Ditore)

Koha Ditore carries a commentary by publisher Veton Surroi in which he elaborates on the recent third round of Serbian presidential elections. Surroi wrote:

1. When the first round of Serbian elections failed, the former candidate and current Serb president Milan Milutinovic, together with his mentor Milosevic, devised a way to win the elections: to falsify votes in the ethnically Albanian town of Malishevë - the same place where several months later Jakup Krasniqi, as one of the heads of KLA, would issue ID cards in a freed Kosovo territory. Milutinovic said at that time, that he had received the necessary votes to overcome the difference in votes against his opponent. History continued and Milutinovic's presidency ends on 5 January of next year, with the possibility of starting his stay in The Hague prison.
If we used a little sarcasm, it would seem that the Albanian voters, the factor for Milutinovic's victory was the guilty one for the third failure for Kostunica to be elected president. In all of the three attempts to be elected president, Kostunica could not lure the famous Malishevë voters, thus he failed. Kostunica is now entering a not so comfortable situation, because he will loose his job as FRY president (because his state will end its existence on 31 January) meanwhile not yet having ensured another post as president, other than the one of his party. Serbia, is now entering a circle of reality: after all Slovenia's, Croatia's, Bosnia's, Kosovo's and Malishevë's that were always guilty for the inner political crisis, who is now to be blamed for the inability of electing a president? Today even the small Montenegro isn't causing any problems.

2. Naturally, Kosovo is not the reason for constant electoral failures. It is post-Kosovo, respectively the fact they had to face the reality after the toppling of Milosevic. One of the unspoken issues, of the true reasons for Kostunica's failures was the conceptual differences within the Serb coalition DOS, should elections be held before or after constitutional changes. Djindjic's supporters say that elections should be held after constitutional changes, which would diminish the power of the president that were laid down by Milosevic into a normal parliamentary system, the functions of the president would be more or less limited. Kostunica's supporters were afraid that constitutional changes would take too much time, moreover now that decision-making has been paralyzed within DOS, and that Kostunica would remain without a public post after the post mortem for FRY is announced.
The issue of the competencies of the president, in fact enters within the overall contexts, the one of the paths after the toppling of Milosevic. Serbia after Milosevic knows clearly where it is not going - the rehabilitating of Milosevic - but it has lost its compass. After a decade of fascism, Serbia lacks a leading force and it is very difficult to believe that it will be clarified, moreover because the process of cleaning the fascist past has not started nor have they started to face this. As seen earlier, in Serbia after the failed president elections we saw that there is side by side reformism led by Labus and fascism led by Seselj, and in between the two stands an electorate that is in deep apathy, or an electorate that nears the consensus of the idea for a greater Serbia that has been alive since the early 90's where most opposition political parties including Kostunica's were included.

3. The future Serb scenario is that there will be another year of political confrontation. The figures, as in chess have not changed, it only depends which one will move first. It seems that Serbia will first elect a president and for this there is a need for new presidential elections or the parliament's president would be appointed as acting president. If the latter happens, there could be demands to dissolve the parliament and the holding of premature parliamentary elections, where every wing of the current DOS alliance would seek its own identity on its own. In this political panorama, a relevant political factor would be Seselj, the only politician that has a constant electorate of about 20% in the last ten years.
Naturally, in this game of chess, there would be taken in account all the constitutional changes, that limit the powers of the president and the legal package that would have to determine the new form of coexistence in Montenegro.
The crisis didn't start with these elections, and it will not end with them. It is a part of a process of cleaning that is very needed for Serbia.

Hysa: Who will be Steiner's partner after 8 December? (Koha Ditore)

Koha Ditore carries a commentary by Ylber Hysa, the director of the Kosovo Action for Civic Initiatives (KACI). Hysa asks: Who will now be Steiner's partner and a guarantor for the agreements that he has reached after the failure of the second Serb presidential elections?

On 8 December Serbia illustrated in the best possible way the political situation there. The inability to go over 51% of votes and the second failure in a row to elect a Serb president, has shown that Serbia has remained half way in their path toward reforms that started on 5 December 2000 as "velvet revolution" that received such big propaganda in western countries. With this failure, Serbia will enter a new phase of political and institutional vacuum and it will be accompanied with the forming of a fragile agreement to manage the co-governing between current rivals that used to be allies in toppling Milosevic's. And not only this, this will not only be a conflict between two sides Kostunica's and Djindjic's, but it will be another chance for the head of the radicals Seselj, who will now attempt to gather around himself all the nationalists, right wingers and Milosevic's support from Sheveningen.

But, what can be the possible consequences for Kosovo after 8 December? First, the created institutions vacuum of the two governing bodies that are political rivals has turned Belgrade into a town with several parallel addresses of political institutions. This will have its affects in the political corpus within Kosovo Serbs, who were also divided in several political lines. If Djindjic's card remains in option, it will only widen these divisions. Now, comparing the controlling line by Covic and Kostunica, the dissatisfied with Covic's policy toward Kosovo, will feel braver. This is not only for Povratak (Nenad Radosavljevic and others that have openly talked against Covic) but also for politicians outside Povratak (Moma Trajkovic and some small political groups formed by Kosovo Serbs). Even more, the failure of presidential elections in Serbia will have direct influence in determining of a politics for Kosovo Serbs in the upcoming months, especially in some aspects raised by the leaders of Kosovo Serbs. These are: participation in the Kosovo Assembly, decentralization, Mitrovica etc.

Now, for all of these aspects there can be new renegotiations, or at least this is what is the aim of Kosovo Serb leaders that opposed the reached agreement between Steiner and Covic. This renegotiation would be made possible to break up this agreement, or to buy time to disable them, or make new agreements with new conditions.

In this aspect, what could happen in Belgrade, will have its consequences in Kosovo, this especially after the first step that Djindjic made after 8 December, would be as he promised earlier is to remove Covic from the post of Serbia's deputy Prime Minister. If this happens, then it would have its direct consequences toward Povratak, but also at the same it would raise the question as to who now is Steiner's partner and guarantee for the agreement that he has reached?

This would place UNMIK chief administrator before a dilemma as to what to do next. To keep the reached agreements and try to implement them with a new partner, for example Djindjic; to be forced to implement agreements on Mitrovica and decentralization based on the force that he has, thus it would be without Belgrade; or to keep status quo?

Whichever version Steiner chooses, will have its difficulties and he will need additional talks to receive the necessary guarantees for cooperation or for not.

If makes an agreement with one side, this will create a problem if he doesn't have a consensus with Serb side, and from what it ahs been already seen, consensus is the lat word that Serb side is using in their political vocabulary.

Besides this, we should not forget Seselj, who will stand guard upon these problems, moreover now that he has an obligation toward his Serb electorate in Kosovo: from the failed president elections on 8 December it was seen once more that Seselj is the strongest politician among Kosovo Serbs. He won 60% of the votes caste by Kosovo Serbs, in percentage this is the highest rate in all electoral zones in Serbia. It is not difficult to see that Seselj plays a teasing role in Mitrovica and elsewhere.

The divided Serb political specter in Kosovo has lately achieved a strange agreement that brought together Rada Trajkovic, Milan Ivanovic and Oliver Ivanovic. It seems that agreement was formed as an instinctive answer from the fear that Belgrade would decide in their name. On the other hand, it would be very difficult to foresee that Serb political representatives have achieved a political maturity to gather around and decide on their own politics in Kosovo. The situation after 8 December with inertia they would again be a convenient client to be included in the rivalry in Belgrade, to become exhibit pieces for the politicians there and not to build an authentic life of their own.

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This is why I didn't criticize the decisions against ex-KLA members (Epoka e Re)

Epoka e Re says that Nowitzki has several times reacted against UNMIK administration and KFOR arrests.

"This doesn't comply with international rights", said Nowitzki. He says that it is a completely different situation when the judges order the arrests. There are several cases when people are kept in prison and then released by a judge, after they served their sentence. In those cases they have the right to ask for compensation. In general, when human rights are concerned, there is a difference between administrative arrests and those made by judges" Nowitzki was quoted as saying.

"When there were administrative arrests, you had reactions of the ombudsperson, while when the decisions were made by judges, even when they were ex-KLA, I had reason why to criticize. But it is understood that persons who were arrested by court and then released on the absence of facts, their staying in prison should be compensated," Nowitzki was quoted as saying.

Nowitzki said that he never heard that a prosecutor offered money to anyone for false testimony "except for some cases published in media, such cases were not brought up at our institution", he said.

Asked about the annulling of decisions and about authority of local institutions Nowitzki said that these are political issues, out of Ombudspersons jurisdiction and he stressed that Kosovo continues to be under UN protectorate.

"Of course local institutions have power on a few things, but there is protectorate here, and the last word on important issues is SRSG's"

Kosovo's ombudsperson didn't want to comment whether Serb authorities are committing institutional violation against Kosovo Albanians, by not giving information on the missing persons for three years now. "The problem of the missing persons (Albanians, Serbs) is another issue, and it is a heavy burden for the present situation and for the perspective of new developments. UNMIK personnel in cooperation with the Serb side should resolve the issue of the missing persons. This should bring results because each day for the families of the missing is more difficult than the other" Kosovo's ombudsperson was quoted as saying in Epoka e Re.

According to Nowitzki, the problem of the missing persons is a problem that all the post war societies had to face. "This is a reality that these families should be ready to face".

Asked by this daily about the concerns caused from police abuses and mistreatments, Nowitzki said "My reaction is that the doors of our institutions are opened for any person that faced abuse or use of force, committed by UNMIK or Kosovar Police.

According to Nowitzki, the property issue is one of the main problems when human rights in Kosovo are concerned. "I hope that the Directorate for Property and Living Issues will start to work in a more effective manner. HDP had a very good budget and I hope that by the end of 2003, this is the deadline that UNMIK chief Michael Steiner has set, results will be achieved since this would help the situation in Kosovo in many ways" concluded Nowitzki in Epoka e Re.

Spahiu: The national flag was not 'changed' by Rugova, but by Hashim Thaçi and Agim Çeku (Koha Ditore)
Koha Ditore carries a commentary by political analyst Nexhmedin Spahiu, who says that the Kosovo Assembly is not dealing with politics and that it has become a simple mechanism of voting for what is being served by the internationals. 'Could the Kosovo Assembly wait for the internationals to serve the symbols of Kosovo?' asked Spahiu. The entire text of his commentary appeared as follows:

Of all reactions caused by the celebration of the 28th November by President Rugova the most worrying reaction was that by associations of the war. 'Rugova should say whether he was offered independence with the condition of changing the anthem and flag'!!!

It is worrisome because it shows a political philosophy which doesn't bring results but constant disappointment. Even more worrisome is when they say that they are or were the most engaged circles for the independence of Kosovo.

First, Kosovo is not as close to independence as people may think. Second, no one offers independence be it even with conditions. Independence is won. Kosovo will become independent, but it will need to take a long path until it reaches independence.

To be independent doesn't mean only independence from Serbia but also independence from Albanian. This is a basic issue. Maybe we will need a referendum to determine what Kosovars want: an independent Kosovo or a Kosovo that would join Albania. There can be no talks about unification with Albania, because in order to join another country you previously need to have a country of your own, which Kosovo still isn't. As for joining Albania, then this is a more complicated issue because even if the majority of Kosovars supports this idea there is still the question on whether or not the Albanian government and people want this, which I truly doubt. In fact, Tirana would rather agree for Kukës and Tropoja to join Kosovo than Kosovo to join Albania.

Therefore, the only path for Kosovo is that of independence. And the independence of Kosovo, I repeat, implies independence from Albania; therefore, it implies different symbols from those of Albania, and it also implies the creation of the Kosovar nation.

In fact, Rugova's advantage as a Kosovar politician is precisely that he has realized this fact earlier than other politicians. The truth is that Rugova was slowly dealing with this issue as he usually deals with politics, as if he was the leader of a nation that is growing older rather than a leader of nation at birth.

However, we shouldn't give credit to Rugova where he doesn't deserve it. The Flag of Kosovo was in fact designed by Wesley Clark's cabinet, and it was legitimized by Hashim Thaçi and Agim Çeku. The national symbol is the symbol that graces the uniform of the army and police. You can look at the symbols of the KPC and KPS. You can look at the symbol of the civil society in Kosovo.

The most paradoxical thing in this issue is the fact that it should be discussed as soon as possible at the Kosovo Assembly; however, the Kosovo Assembly is not dealing with politics. It has become a simple mechanism of voting for what is being served by the internationals. Could the Kosovo Assembly wait for the internationals to serve the symbols of Kosovo. No, no, they are not fools to form a state and then have us accusing them that they have 'changed our flags'. As a matter of fact why should they become a state? So that we can use them later of dividing us from Albania! No, no. Independence is won; no one gives it to you. Even if they give it to you it is not worth a thing.

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In its 1st year Assembly approves ten laws, Steiner annuls 1 and signs 2 (Zëri)

Zëri says that for one-year only two laws were approved by Kosovo Assembly and signed by chief administrator Steiner. Assembly has also approved two resolutions, one on defense of Kosovo's territorial integrity and the other as rebuttal preamble of Serbia and Montenegro Constitutional Charter. Assembly was expected to approve seven more laws while SRSG Michel Steiner annulled one.

Zëri says that the 10 December of 2001 will be remembered as date with constitution of Kosovo's Assembly, which was followed by disagreements and total blockade of the Assembly. Assembly work was unblocked only after the arrival of present SRSG Michael Steiner, who after the talks with the main Kosovo leaders determined the dates when the agreement for wider coalition was to be signed.

Zëri recalls that chief administrator Michael Steiner annulled the resolution on Kosovo's territorial integrity only twenty minutes after its approval at the assembly. Steiner didn't annul the second resolution on inclusion of Kosovo in S and M Union preamble, but he reacted by issuing a pres release, which said that Kosovo's status could not be determined by Belgrade or Prishtina but only by UN SC.

Zëri says that conflicts with Steiner gradually becalmed, and then started accuses against Kosovo assembly for delay on approving laws.

On the legislative aspect, deputies have approved ten laws. SRSG Michael Steiner has refused to approve the law on higher education, since deputies didn't accept a proposed article from Steiner's office, which foresaw legitimizing of University in northern Mitrovica. Leaving this university out of system, made Steiner search for other forms based on Constitutional Framework, which would keep this law in power.

Zëri talks about the laws that are to be approved and says that except for the ministers of Kosovo's government, experts of European Council and UNMIK legal office helped on drafting of the laws. There is an agreement in principle for Kosovo laws to be in accordance with EU standards.

Zëri says that Kosovo assembly's main challenge remains the small budget and financial troubles.

Zëri says that the seven laws remain to be approved by SRSG Michael Steiner even though they drafted in accordance with the standards. According to experts, the problem is not Michael Steiner's signature but the green light from Security Council.

While many laws are not drafted or approved, different UNMIK regulations continue to cover law gap, concludes Zëri.